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Abstract
Elite schools in Hungary cherry pick high achieving students from general
primary schools. The geographical coverage of elite schools has remained
unchanged since 1999, when the establishment of new elite schools stopped.
We exploit this geographical variation and estimate the impact of high
achieving peers leaving the class on student achievement, behaviour, and
aspirations for higher education. Our estimates indicate moderate but
heterogeneous effects on those left behind in general primary schools.
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1 Introduction
Peer effects are believed to influence many social outcomes. Peers may play
a role in a person’s health (Cohen-Cole & Fletcher, 2008), empathy (Boisjoly
et al., 2006), productivity (Falk & Ichino, 2006), entrepreneurship (Lerner &
Malmendier, 2013) and the propensity to engage in criminal activities (Kling
et al., 2005). However, the effect of peers on student achievement is more
ambiguous. In a comprehensive review of the literature, Sacerdote (2014) finds
that although about half the studies estimate modest to large peer effects on
student achievement, another half of the studies do not find any evidence of
peer effects at all.
In this paper, we use Hungarian data to estimate the effect of high ability
peers leaving the class on achievement, behaviour, and aspirations of children
who were left behind. Hungary provides a unique setting to study what happens
when the highest achieving peers leave the class. In the 1990s, many elite schools
emerged across Hungary as a response to the centralized system of education
under communist rule. The establishment of these new elite schools stopped in
1999 and their geographical coverage has remained unchanged since then.
The highest achieving primary school students typically switch to an elite
school after grade 6 (age 12), two years before the end of primary education.
In this context, we first show that the distance to the nearest elite school is
unrelated to pupils’ academic ability as measured in grade 6. Nonetheless, we
also show that the distance to the nearest elite school is a strong predictor of
the probability that the highest achieving pupils leave their class and switch to
an elite school after grade 6. Using the distance to the nearest elite schools as
an instrumental variable, we find that the performance of stayers on grade 8
mathematics test scores is negatively impacted by the proportion of peers who
switch to an elite school at the end of grade 6, two years before. Specifically, we
find that a 5 percentage points increase in the share of leavers (one student in
an average sized class) leads to a reduction in mathematics test scores of about
4% of a standard deviation for stayers.
Our paper contributes to the large and still growing literature on peer effects
at school (see e.g. Angrist & Lang, 2004; Carrell et al., 2009). Our paper is also
closely related to the literature on elite schools and tracking (Abdulkadiroglu
et al., 2014; Clark et al., 2016; Pop-Eleches & Urquiola, 2013). To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is one of the very first to evaluate the effect of elite
schools on non-elite students, whereas earlier literature mainly focused on the
effect of elite schools on elite students. Guyon et al. (2012) provide, however,
an evaluation of the overall effect of the sudden extension of elite schools in
Northern Ireland in the late 1980s, which encompasses the effect of these schools
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on both non-elite and elite students.
The relevance of our results directly relates to the school choice debate. The
effects of top students are at the centre of several policy interventions related
to, among others, ability tracking versus detracking, school segregation versus
school busing, and racial segregation versus affirmative action (Lin, 2010). In
the US, for example, the emergence of charter schools could lead to comparable
cherry picking and the subsequent impact for those left behind in public schools.
2 Background
In the Hungarian education system, compulsory education starts at the age of
six and ends at the age of sixteen. Children enrol in primary education when
they reach school maturity (at the age of six) and continue primary education
for four, six, or eight years. Eight-year primary education was introduced under
communist rule, and is the most widespread type of primary education in all
Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1989, children can also switch to an elite
school after finishing the fourth grade (age 10) or after finishing the sixth grade
(age 12). The introduction of elite schools is also typical for most countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, as a response to the centralized system of educa-
tion, uniformly imposed under communism.1 In the year of their introduction
(1989), only two elite schools were opened. By 1999, 44 percent of the Hungar-
ian regions included at least one elite school. This corresponds to 6.36 percent
of all municipalities, as depicted in Figure 1. Historically, the most developed
regions (e.g. cities) pushed more for the establishment of elite schools. As a
result, the geographical coverage in 1999 strongly relied on socio-economic sta-
tus, and was hence far from random. However, as we will show in Section 5.1
(Table 2), the distance to elite schools is independent of student test scores in
grade 6, before students start leaving, conditional on controls.2
The aim of elite schools is to prepare students for university. They pro-
vide the exact same qualification (e´rettse´gi) as the academic secondary schools
(gimna´zium)3, although they are considered more prestigious - comparable to
grammar schools in the UK or exam schools in the US. The central government
halted elite school formation in 1999. The reason for this was the presumed neg-
ative effects on social cohesion. Nonetheless, although no new elite schools were
formed after 1999, the elite schools already in place were allowed to continue
1A more comprehensive overview of the Hungarian education system and the introduction
of elite schools is available on https://cps.ceu.edu/publications/working-papers/educational-
system-hungary.
2In addition, the average distance to the closest elite schools remained virtually constant
over time for the available cohorts, at around 16.3 kilometres.
3The two other tracks are a vocational track (szakko¨ze´piskola) and a trade track (sza-
kiskola).
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Figure 1: Adoption of elite schools in Hungary.
1990
1999
2017
Notes: This figure displays elite school adoption over time in Hungary. Dark areas indicate
Hungarian municipalities with at least one elite school. Since the introduction of the first elite
school in 1989 in Budapest, their adoption has exploded between 1990 and 1999, when elite school
establishment was halted. The geographical coverage of elite schools has remained unchanged since
then. This is illustrated in the bottom panel using 2017 data.
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their operations. Today, around 300 elite schools operate throughout Hungary,
resulting in over 5,000 students leaving their classes every year to enrol in an
elite school - around 6% of all primary education students.
Admission to elite schools (and to upper secondary schools, in general) pro-
ceeds as follows in Hungary. First, each student must rank any number of
elite schools they wish to apply to (application is free). Second, each stu-
dent who applied to at least one elite school must take a central entrance
exam in mathematics and in Hungarian language. Each school can decide
about the weight of this central exam in their own admission process, but
its weight must be between 50% percent and 100%. The schools can also
take previous grades and an institutionally organized (typically oral) entrance
exam into account. Finally, each school must rank every student who applied
to their institution, and then a central Gale-Shapley type algorithm allocates
all students to one school (see http://www.matching-in-practice.eu/secondary-
schools-in-hungary/). Naturally, students with more ‘exposure’ to elite schools
are more likely to apply. This ‘exposure’ might be due to high-status parents,
better abilities, or - as we argue - distance. Ultimately, the school principal
decides on the admission of students.4 Although most elite schools are public
(75%) and do not charge tuition fees, elite schools that are privately organized,
as foundation (4%) or church schools (20%) can charge tuition.5
In the Hungarian education system, classes are typically taught by the same
teacher in the first four grades, for all subjects. Thereafter, from grade 5 to
grade 8, teachers specialize in a certain subject and teach this specific course.
However, the same group of teachers teaches the same students during this
period. Once students have departed to an elite school, it is possible, but not
frequent, that the school decides to reshuﬄe classes if there are too few students
left in each class. Nonetheless, we formally test, and reject, whether our results
are driven by class reshuﬄing.
4The autonomy of schools to select students inhibits us from using a regression discontinuity
design due to missing data on admission criteria.
5The remaining 1% of elite school providers is categorized as ‘other’, and includes for-profit
companies and ‘multi-purpose small area associations’. There are no official statistics about
the fees charged by private elite schools in Hungary, if they do. Visiting the websites of a
number of private elite schools, we can report that their monthly tuition fee is around 60-80
thousand Hungarian forints, which is around 200-300 euros.
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Dataset Construction
Our dataset is constructed by integrating student, class, and school level infor-
mation from the National Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC) database,
and the geographic location of students and schools from the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences Geography (GEO) database. The NABC covers all students in com-
pulsory education in Hungary.6 It includes standardized test scores for mathe-
matics and reading that follows the model of the OECD Programme for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA). In addition, teacher-graded GPA scores are
collected, as well as behavioural assessments done by the teacher for every stu-
dent on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where higher scores indicate better behaviour.
Finally, students are asked whether they aspire to enrol in higher education (at
the Bachelor or Master level) after completing compulsory education.7
Unlike PISA, which is conducted once every three years, the NABC is con-
ducted annually. Each year, the NABC includes test scores of a cohort of
students at the end of grade 6 (age 12) and just before graduation from primary
school, in grade 8 (age 14). The timing of the first test corresponds to the final
month of grade 6 (May) before students leave to elite schools. Considering these
moments of data collection, we focus our analysis on the effect of students leav-
ing for elite schools after grade 6. In subsequent analyses, therefore, we study
two-year differences in test scores between grade 6 and grade 8. This study uses
data from 2008 to the most recent records in 2015, encompassing the graduating
cohorts in grade 8 of 2010 to 2017.
For each student in grade 6, we obtain a measure of the distance from their
home to the nearest elite school. This data is retrieved from the GEO database
and is available from 2008 to 2016. Volan, the official Hungarian bus company
participated in the establishment of the database. Distance measures were cal-
culated using the routes followed by buses of Volan, and indicate the exact
distance by bus, in meters, from students’ home addresses to the nearest elite
school. In addition, alternative measures such as time in minutes by bus and
time in minutes by car are available. We matched all distance measures to stu-
dents in the NABC data. We take the mean distance to the closest elite school
of each student’s peers (excluding that student’s distance) at the class level.
Using student addresses in grade 6 and grade 8, we are also able to assess the
6Earlier studies using this dataset include Kertesi & Kezdi (2011) on the Roma/non-Roma
test score gap.
7Given that GPA and behaviour (and higher education aspirations) were teacher- (student-)
reported, the share of missing data is higher than for compulsory centralized tests. We observe
GPA for 64 percent of the sample, behaviour for 74 percent, and aspirations for 77 percent.
We therefore discuss the effects on these alternative outcome variables in Section 5.4, while
focusing our main analysis on student test scores in Section 5.1.
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mobility of students and households within this two-year period.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1. Our sample includes 536,846 stu-
dents in primary education. We divide this sample into those who leave general
education schools for elite schools after grade 6 (“Leavers”; N=38,240) and those
who are left behind (“Stayers”; N=498,606). In the final column of Table 1, we
display the group-level differences of all the variables.
Elite schools attract exceptionally high achieving students. Students leaving
for elite schools score almost one standard deviation higher than the typical
student left behind in general primary education on the standardized NABC
mathematics and reading tests in grade 6.8 ‘Elite students’ also obtain higher
GPA scores on average, are perceived to behave better, and are more likely to
aspire enrolling in higher studies.
Students who leave general primary education for elite schools are more
likely to come from families with a higher socio-economic status - proxied by
parental education, employment, and the number of books in the family. Also,
boys are slightly more likely to enrol in elite schools (although boys comprise
52.5 percent of leavers, the corresponding share of girls among the stayers is
49.9 percent).
In grade 6, the average class size is relatively similar for leavers and stayers,
at 23 and 24 students per class, respectively.9 It naturally follows that the
departure of high achieving students results in a decreased class size in grade 8
for those left behind, which may also affect test scores (Fredriksson et al., 2013;
Krueger & Whitmore, 2001). In our dataset, however, the number of leavers
per class is less than or equal to two in almost 83 percent of the classes, and less
than or equal to three in 90 percent of the classes. Hence, this limited class size
effect is unlikely to drive the results we present in this paper (see also Section
6).
The spatial mobility of students is very low in Hungary, as almost 93 percent
of students do not move between grade 6 and grade 8. The percentage of
students who moved and went to an elite school is only 0.4 percent. Two
out of three movers in our dataset do not switch schools, which also suggests
that spatial mobility motivated by school choice is very limited in Hungary.
The average distance to the nearest elite school is less than half for leavers
8Table B1 in the Appendix disentangles this comparison for every reference group (class,
school, settlement (ZIP-code), region, and cohort).
9However, in grade 8, classes in elite schools consisting of leavers are significantly and
substantially larger (30 compared to 21). This can be explained by the fact that elite schools
are commonly organized within secondary schools where classes are larger on average.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Stayers (N=498,606) Leavers (N=38,240)
Mean SD Mean SD Diff
Outcome variables
Test scores
Mathematics grade 6 1490.320 185.507 1646.725 174.262 -156.405
Mathematics grade 8 1604.049 198.106 1747.011 176.631 -142.962
Reading grade 6 1480.045 193.773 1644.262 166.401 -164.217
Reading grade 8 1554.320 197.706 1709.823 162.976 -155.503
GPA
GPA grade 6 4.003 0.733 4.618 0.433 -0.615
GPA grade 8 3.935 0.776 4.230 0.569 -0.294
Behaviour
Score in grade 6 4.120 0.767 4.638 0.509 -0.518
Score in grade 8 4.085 0.808 4.426 0.615 -0.341
Aspirations
Share in grade 6 0.513 0.499 0.913 0.281 -0.399
Share in grade 8 0.512 0.499 0.903 0.296 -0.391
Student characteristics
Gender
Male 0.499 0.500 0.525 0.500 -0.027
Education parents
Father
Primary 0.163 0.369 0.031 0.175 0.131
Secondary 0.544 0.498 0.413 0.492 0.131
Higher 0.150 0.357 0.415 0.493 -0.265
Mother
Primary 0.200 0.400 0.034 0.180 0.167
Secondary 0.482 0.500 0.351 0.477 0.131
Higher 0.196 0.397 0.486 0.500 -0.290
Employment parents
Father 0.667 0.471 0.709 0.454 -0.041
Mother 0.624 0.484 0.726 0.446 -0.102
Books at home
<50 0.273 0.446 0.066 0.248 0.207
>50 & <300 0.358 0.479 0.285 0.451 0.073
>300 0.256 0.437 0.525 0.499 -0.268
Class size
Grade 6 23.116 5.446 24.109 4.878 -0.993
Grade 8 21.281 5.518 30.107 5.251 -8.826
Spatial mobility
Student moved (G6-G8) 0.073 0.080 0.087 0.086 -0.014
Distance (km) 16.954 16.082 7.030 9.802 9.923
Mean class distance (km) 16.836 14.943 7.598 8.623 9.237
School characteristics
Schools where no one left
(54.68%)
Schools where someone left
(45.32%)
Mathematics grade 6 1479.887 191.668 1515.765 184.614 -35.877
Reading grade 6 1465.892 199.282 1509.294 191.570 -43.402
GPA grade 6 3.983 0.758 4.090 0.709 -0.107
Behaviour grade 6 4.096 0.786 4.196 0.742 -0.100
Aspirations grade 6 0.471 0.499 0.590 0.492 -0.119
Father Higher Edu 0.122 0.327 0.200 0.400 -0.078
Mother Higher Edu 0.166 0.372 0.250 0.433 -0.085
>300 books 0.223 0.416 0.312 0.463 -0.089
Class size in grade 6 22.194 6.135 23.944 4.641 -1.750
Distance (km) 23.540 15.765 10.597 14.804 12.943
Share of students leaving 0 0 0.100 0.131 -0.100
Notes: All differences (‘Diff’) are significant at the 0.01 level. ‘Stayers’: students left behind in
primary schools. ‘Leavers’: students leaving their classes and schools for an elite school. In all
subsequent analyses, we standardize mathematics and reading test scores to a mean of zero and
unit variance within grade and year. ‘Schools where no one left’ correspond to schools where in
a given cohort no student left to an elite school. ‘GPA’ is the grade point average, graded by
the teacher. ‘Behaviour’ is measured as a Likert scale (1-5), graded by the teacher, with higher
scores indicating better behaviour. ‘Aspirations’ represents a dummy indicating students’ response
to the survey question asking whether he or she aims to enrol in higher education. The latter three
outcome variables are presented for the subsample of students where data was observed, at 64%,
74%, and 77%, respectively. ‘Distance’ measures the mean class distance to the nearest elite school
in kilometres from the students’ home address. 8
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compared to stayers, both at the individual and the class level. This difference
already hints at distance being a potential “pull factor” for parents to opt out of
general primary schools, in line with the literature on school choice (e.g. Burgess
et al., 2015; Echenique & Yenmez, 2015; Hastings & Weinstein, 2008), and also
consistent with the low residential mobility in Hungary. Measuring residential
mobility as the share of people who moved to another dwelling within the last
five-year period, Hungary ranks 23rd out of 28 EU countries, at a level of mobility
(7.4 percent) well below the EU average (17.8 percent).10 This further supports
our claim that Hungary offers an interesting setting to study the effect of high
achieving peers, using distance as an instrument, given the low threat of sorting
into areas with elite schools.
Dividing all Hungarian schools into schools where no students left in a given
year and schools where at least one student left to an elite school, we see that
almost half of students are in schools where the best students are leaving. In
terms of student achievement and socio-economic status, the differences between
schools are less pronounced than the aforementioned differences between stu-
dents. This suggests that, within general primary schools, students leaving for
elite schools are the highest achievers, and leavers are not simply sorting into
general primary schools before grade 6. In schools where at least one student
left, the share of leavers is around 10 percent, or approximately two students
in an average class in grade 6. For students in these schools, the mean distance
to the nearest elite school is significantly lower compared to students in schools
where no one is leaving.
10As per Eurostat. See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=ilc hcmp05
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4 Empirical Methodology
We are interested in the causal effect of high achieving peers on students left
behind in general primary education. The share of students who leave for an
elite school might be endogenous to the quality of the school. Higher quality
schools can either send out more students, as they offer better preparation for
elite school entrance exams, or send out fewer students, as parents may prefer to
avoid switching costs when quality improvements are likely to be limited. Fig-
ure 2 displays the smoothed relationship between the class-level distance to an
elite school and the percentage of students leaving a class. This share decreases
with distance, approaching zero as the mean class distance grows higher. As
suggested by this graph, the distance to an elite school is an important deter-
minant of high achieving students’ departure to an elite school. Geographical
variation in historical elite school establishment allows us to construct an instru-
ment for the share of leavers, based on the distance to the nearest elite schools.
We use this distance-induced variation in the share of leavers to estimate the
causal effect on the children who were left behind.
Figure 2: Percentage of leavers in a class as a function of distance.
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95% CI local polynomial estimate
Notes: This figure displays a local polynomial smoothed kernel density plot of the unconditional
relationship between mean class distance to elite schools and the percentage of leavers in a class.
Using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), we estimate the second stage:
Yictr = β0 + δ2SLSPctr +αXictr + ρr + φt + ictr (1)
where Yictr represents the outcome variable in grade 8 of student i in class c,
year t, and region r. Pctr is the percentage of classroom peers enrolled in an elite
school. Xictr includes controls both at the individual and class level (outcome
10
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variable in grade 6, gender, socio-economic indicators, class size in grade 6).11
ρr and φt are vectors of regional and cohort fixed effects.
The corresponding first stage equation is:
Pctr = γ0 + γ1Dctr + λXictr + ρr + φt + νictr (2)
Dctr represents our instrument, namely, the public transport distance to the
closest elite school.12 Xictr includes controls as in equation (1).
Three points about equations (1) and (2) are worth mentioning. First, we
apply 2SLS using the class mean public transport distance to the closest elite
school as an instrument. In the tables presented in Section 5, all first stage
F-statistics are well above the conventional weak instruments thresholds. Ad-
ditional first stage results are presented in Table B2 for various sets of controls.
Consistent coefficients and F-statistics well above conventional thresholds sug-
gest that the mean class distance to an elite school is a strong instrument for
the share of students leaving for elite schools.
Second, historically, highly developed regions pushed more for the establish-
ment of elite schools in the education market. Therefore, we include region fixed
effects and exploit variation in distance within regions. In addition, we include
a full set of socio-economic controls (parental education, parental employment,
and number of books at home) both at the individual level and at the class level
(calculated as the leave-out-mean).13
Third, it is possible that parents living far away from elite schools move close
to an elite school before they choose to enrol their children. This would render
our instrument invalid. In Section 5.1 (Table 2) we provide an empirical check
of the assumption that students are not sorting into regions with elite schools.
As discussed before, residential mobility in Hungary is extremely low. Given
the rigid educational landscape since 1999 in this immobile society, the distance
to elite schools should be independent of test scores before students leave to
elite schools. Therefore, we regress the class mean distance to elite schools on
mathematics and reading test scores in grade 6, conditional on individual con-
trols, class-level controls and fixed effects. The results in Table 2 suggest there
is no significant relationship between grade 6 test scores and the mean distance
11Note that we obtain analogous results when including the full set of individual charac-
teristics reported in Table 1. This is in line with intuition as socio-economic variables are
typically strongly correlated.
12Distance is measured as the class mean of the number of meters on the bus route from
a student’s home address (settlement code) to the elite school’s location (settlement code).
Hence, we observe some ‘zero’ distances, as elite schools can be located in a student’s settle-
ment. Our findings are robust to the alternative specification γ1Dctr = θ0D0ctr + θ1Dctr with
θ0D0ctr = 0 when the mean class distance to an elite school is larger than 0. When the mean
distance is 0, Dctr = 0 while D0ctr = 1. Hence, θ0 estimates the effect when the mean class
distance is 0 and θ1 otherwise.
13In Table B3 in the Appendix, we obtain similar results when repeating our analysis without
cities to rule out bias from elite schools clustering in the most developed regions.
11
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to an elite school, consistent with the exclusion restriction of our instrument.14
Repeating the regressions with grade 8 test scores (reduced form), we do find a
significant effect of distance on mathematics test scores. This finding supports
the validity of distance as our instrument and already suggests that there is an
effect of high achieving peers leaving the class.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Before we present the main results, one important issue is worth mentioning.
The higher the fraction of leavers, the more negatively selected the sample of
stayers. For this purpose, we divide the students into quartiles of the ability
distribution in grade 6, where the quartile is calculated on the whole popu-
lation of students. Students leaving to elite schools are high ability students,
and hence mostly concentrated in the top quartile (Q1). As a result, leaving
students decrease the mean Q1 scores the most, reducing the treatment effects
for this subgroup. To deal with this issue, we define the sample of stayers as
students who were not in Q1 pre-treatment. Therefore, our working sample in
the analyses below includes students in Q2-Q4 who are left behind in primary
schools. Our main analyses and corresponding appendices focus on the effect
of leavers on test scores of students left behind in general primary education
who were in the second, third, and fourth quartile of the ability distribution in
grade 6 (N=365,015).15 Since mathematics and reading test scores are included
as standardized outcome measures, the coefficients of these outcomes can be
interpreted as effect sizes in terms of standard deviations.
In the falsification tests in Table 2, we show that the distance to the nearest
elite school is unrelated to pupils’ academic ability as measured in grade 6.
Conditional on individual and class characteristics, and including region and
cohort fixed effects, we cannot find a significant association between test scores
in grade 6 and the class mean distance to the nearest elite school. Nonetheless,
from our first stage estimates, it is clear that the mean class distance is a strong
predictor of the percentage of students leaving for elite schools, even when the
14We also repeat our analysis when restricting the sample to students who did not move
between grade 6 and grade 8, and find similar results (see Section 5.2 and Table B3). In
addition, this result holds even if we include both the distance to an elite school that students
can go to after grade 6 and the distance to an elite school that students can go to after grade
4. It is important to note, however, that elite schools where students can go to after grade 4
are not the same schools as the elite schools that students can go to after grade 6. Only two
elite schools in Hungary accept students both after grade 4 and after grade 6.
15Nonetheless, the 2SLS results for the full sample that includes Q1 are consistent with
the results for the working sample: a significantly negative effect for mathematics (coefficient:
-0.0057, standard error: 0.0015) and an insignificant effect for reading (coefficient: -0.0014,
standard error: 0.0011), although different in magnitude.
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full set of controls is included: an increase of 10 kilometres in the mean class
distance coincides with a decrease of about 1.5 percentage points in the share of
students per class leaving for elite schools. This negative coefficient corresponds
to the negative slope seen in Figure 2. Moreover, we show in Table B2 that the
first stage relationship between distance and the share of leavers appears very
stable across specifications. In sum, the falsification tests and the first stage
findings strengthen our claim that students are not sorting into regions with
elite schools.
We now turn to the results. For both outcomes, we present OLS estimates
and 2SLS estimates. The na¨ıve OLS results indicate that, on average, students
left behind perform worse in mathematics and reading when they are in classes
where the percentage of peers who left the class is higher. In terms of mag-
nitude, these negative effects are modest: a 5 percentage point increase in the
share of students leaving, which corresponds to one student leaving in an aver-
age class, results in a decrease of 0.008 SD and 0.006 SD in mathematics and
reading, respectively. As argued before, these na¨ıve estimates might be prone
to endogeneity issues, which could bias our estimates in both directions.
Instrumenting the share of students leaving by the mean class distance indi-
cates that students left behind perform worse in mathematics when they are in
classes where the percentage of peers who left is higher. In terms of magnitude,
a 5 percentage point increase in the share of students who left corresponds to
a 0.038 SD reduction in mathematics test scores. In other words, in an average
class, the departure of one high achieving student lowers the mean mathematics
test score of the peers who were left behind by about 4 percent of a standard
deviation. In contrast, we do not find a significant effect on reading. The dis-
crepancy in 2SLS coefficients between mathematics and reading could be linked
to mathematics being commonly perceived as a better proxy of ability. Hence,
when the selectivity of elite schools hinges on mathematical abilities, we expect
that the students who leave are particularly the ones with the highest mathe-
matics scores, so larger effects are expected for mathematics than for reading.
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Table 2: Effect of students leaving the class to an elite school on stayers’ achieve-
ment by quartile of the ability distribution in grade 6
Mean Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Mathematics Falsification test -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004
(N=365,015) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
OLS -0.0015*** -0.0007 -0.0007* -0.0013***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
First stage -0.1467*** -0.1275*** -0.1483*** -0.1668***
(0.0205) (0.0179) (0.0204) (0.0241)
2SLS -0.0077** -0.0104** -0.0070* -0.0060*
(0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0038)
Reading Falsification test -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0001
(N=365,015) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
OLS -0.0011*** -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0006**
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
First stage -0.1460*** -0.1269*** -0.1479*** -0.1662***
(0.0205) (0.0179) (0.0204) (0.0241)
2SLS 0.0011 -0.0026 0.0028 0.0016
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0027)
Notes: This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving
for elite schools (one percentage point change), first stage estimates, and a falsification test. We
control for individual (previous test score, gender, maternal education, and books at home) and
class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics.
Class level variables are obtained by leaving out individual observations (leave-out-mean). We also
include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. F-
statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well
above conventional thresholds. ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result for the working sample: students
in Q2-Q4 of the ability distribution in grade 6 who are left behind in primary schools. Falsification
test includes a regression of grade 6 test scores on class mean distance to the nearest elite school
using exactly the same specification and controls as the main regression. Quartiles are constructed
using the grade 6 mean score on mathematics and reading of both stayers and leavers. For example,
students in Q4 attained an average test score in the lowest quartile of all Hungarian students. ***
Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.
5.2 Robustness Checks
Before further disentangling this mean effect by quartile of the ability distribu-
tion, we assess its consistency across different robustness checks.
First, we repeat our analysis using different measures of distance in Table
B3 (Panel A). Using the time of the commute (by car or bus) between students’
home addresses and the nearest elite school as instruments, we obtain very
similar results, and all the first stage F-statistics are well above the conventional
weak instruments thresholds.
Second, if students living closer to elite schools exhibit a larger growth po-
tential in addition to higher abilities, specification bias could be driving our
results. Therefore, we re-estimate the main results including second and third
degree polynomials of previous test scores. The results are presented in Ta-
ble B3 (Panel B). Again, coefficients obtained when (nonlinear) student growth
rates are accounted for are consistent with the results in Table 2.
Third, we restrict our sample to further dismiss parallel explanations be-
hind our results. We limit our sample to schools that retained a fixed number
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of classes between grade 6 and grade 8. Focusing on this subsample allows us
to rule out the possibility that the observed results are driven by students being
reshuﬄed into new classes. Panel B of Table B3 presents the results. The coef-
ficient obtained for mathematics is almost identical to the coefficient reported
in Table 2 and the coefficient for reading remains small and insignificant, which
suggests that the reshuﬄing effect is not driving our results.
Next, we leave out the capital, Budapest, and other major Hungarian cities
to assess whether our results are driven by elite schools clustered in the most
developed regions. Again, Table B3 reports results that are consistent with our
main findings.
To further back our claim that distance is not endogenous to school choice
in Hungary, we restrict our sample to those classes where no students moved
between grade 6 and grade 8. The estimated impact of high achieving peers
leaving to elite schools is similar to the estimated effect in the full sample.
As another robustness check, we limit the sample by restricting the class
distance and the share of leavers to not exceed the mean by more than two
standard deviations. This corresponds to a maximum distance of 45.9 kilome-
tres, and 27.6 percent of leavers - or around five students in an average class.
We do this to attenuate the influence of outliers with respect to distance to elite
schools and the share of leavers in a class. Our main results are robust to these
additional specifications.
As a last robustness check, we exploit the natural variation in cohort compo-
sition across time within a given school to assess our results under an alternative
identification strategy. This is accomplished by focusing on schools where at
least one student left in every cohort and a series of fixed effects models:
Yist = ψ0 + ψ1Pst +ψ2Xist + φt + ωs + ηst+ υist (3)
Where Pst now measures the share of leavers at the school level andXist includes
school-level characteristics. φt, ωs, and ηs are cohort fixed effects, school fixed
effects, and school-specific time trends. υist is the error term. Note that both
approaches essentially rely on, and benefit from, parents in Hungary not moving
to areas with elite schools. Distance is conceptually a valid instrument when
parents do not move to send their children to elite schools, while this residential
immobility also strengthens the assumption that between-cohort variation in the
share of leavers is random. In contrast to other studies using between-cohort
variation (e.g. Carrell & Hoekstra, 2010), the balancing test cannot hold in
our setting, as the share of leavers is directly related to student characteristics.
Therefore, we chose the IV method as our main empirical strategy. Nonetheless,
our estimates for mathematics in Table B4 point at the same direction and are
largely similar in size - but, as is common when using IV, estimates appear
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Table 3: Heterogeneous treatment effects
Gender Socio-Economic Status (SES)
Mean Boys Girls Low SES High SES
Mathematics -0.0077*** -0.0056 -0.0099*** -0.0103 -0.0099***
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0070) (0.0026)
Reading 0.0011 0.0014 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0045*
(0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0025)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change). We control for individual (previous test score, gender,
maternal education, and books at home) and class level (gender, maternal education, books at home,
and class size in grade 6) characteristics. Class level variables are obtained by leaving out individual
observations (leave-out-mean). We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the regional level. F-statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using
the same set of controls) are well above conventional thresholds. ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result
presented in Table 2. *** Significant at 1% level. * Significant at 10% level.
somewhat amplified (Bingley & Martinello, 2017).16 The estimates for reading,
however, are significantly negative and should be interpreted with caution as the
balancing test does not hold when using between-cohort variation. Also note
that the heterogeneous effects by ability, discussed below, are similar when using
between-cohort variation in the share of leavers (Figure A1 in the Appendix).
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
Despite this robust mean effect, it might be that heterogeneous effects with
opposite directions result in lower average treatment effects. Therefore, we
estimate the 2SLS model for various subgroups. Table 2 reports effects for
every quartile of the ability distribution. Quartiles are constructed using the
grade 6 mean score on mathematics and reading. As is clear from Table 2,
negative effects on mathematics test scores are especially pronounced among
high achievers left behind (Q2). In terms of magnitude, mathematics test scores
for Q2 students reduce by about 0.05 SD when one student leaves (around 5
percent) to an elite school. On the other hand, the effect on reading test scores
is insignificant regardless of the quartile.
Table 3 presents heterogeneous effects by gender and socio-economic status
(SES). We define low SES students as those students whose mothers attained
at most a secondary education degree. High SES students’ mothers attained
at least a Bachelor’s degree. For mathematics, it can be seen that high SES
16As suggested by an anonymous referee, we ran the IV estimation on the same set of
schools as the fixed effects estimation. The effects are consistent with the main specification
albeit larger and with inflated standard errors due to a restricted sample: -0.0151 (0.0088) for
mathematics and -0.0069 (0.0062) for reading.
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students and girls are negatively affected, with the effect of one leaving student
of about 0.05 SD decrease in grade 8 test scores. On the contrary, effects are
not different from zero for boys and low SES students. For reading, only high
SES students are negatively affected by about 0.02 SD for one student leaving.
Also, the gender of those who are leaving the class to elite schools does not seem
to affect the estimated effects (Table B5).
5.4 Alternative Outcomes
For a subsample of students, we also observe GPA scores (64%), behavioural
assessments by teachers (74%), and students’ aspirations for higher education
(77%). Due to this selective reporting by teachers, students’ alternative out-
comes are likely affected by the class composition. For instance, more ‘potential
leavers’ in a class could raise the bar, leading to higher teacher expectations,
and lower GPA scores for those left behind. Consequently, the balancing tests
for alternative outcomes are unlikely to hold. Conducting the balancing tests
in Table B6, we find that this indeed is the case for GPA and behaviour.17 In
classes further away from elite schools, and hence with less potential leavers,
students left behind receive better teacher evaluations for GPA and aspirations
in grade 6. Hence, sufficient caution is required when interpreting our findings
for alternative outcomes.
Table 4 presents mean effects, and treatment effects by quartile in terms of
ability in grade 6, as in Table 2. We only find a significant effect of students
leaving on the higher education aspirations of stayers in Quartile 3. In terms of
magnitude, one student leaving to an elite school increase Q3 students’ higher
education aspirations by about 1.5 percentage points. Most other effects are
insignificant and range from about 0 to 1 percentage point in magnitude.
Table 5 presents heterogeneous effects by gender and socio-economic status
(SES). We find negative effects on behaviour that are more pronounced for
girls and high SES students, while effects for boys and low SES students are
insignificantly different from zero. The magnitude of the effects is close to zero
for GPA and aspirations, while the negative effect on behaviour for girls (high
SES students) amounts to about 3 (2.5) percentage points.
In sum, our main results hide considerable heterogeneity by students’ gender
and socio-economic background. We find that the departure of high achieving
students to elite schools negatively impacts girls, and high achieving students
who are left behind, alongside student from a similar socio-economic background
(high SES) as the students who left.
17We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting these additional balancing tests.
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6 Discussion
Typically, one or two students leave their class to elite schools. This limited
change in class size is unlikely to explain the size of the effects. Restricting
the number of leavers in Table B3 did not affect our estimates, which suggests
that class size changes are not the (main) driver of the observed effects. Using
the class size effects on student achievement from the literature, ranging from
about 2 percent to about 6 percent of a standard deviation (Angrist & Lavy,
1999; Bressoux et al., 2009; Fredriksson et al., 2013; Heinesen, 2010; Jepsen &
Rivkin, 2009; Krueger, 1999), with the exception of Hoxby (2000) who finds
no effects, our negative peer effects would become even larger, ranging from
about 6 percent to about 10 percent of a standard deviation. Hence, our results
represent a lower bound.
Looking at heterogeneous effects, we found that negative effects are con-
centrated among high ability, high SES students and girls left behind. The
latter effect can be linked to previous studies indicating that girls benefit more
from education inputs and interventions in general (Angrist et al., 2009; Katz
et al., 2001), and in particular benefit more from brighter peers (Lavy et al.,
2012). Given the similarity between high SES, high ability students and the stu-
dents leaving, it is likely that micro-interactions are at play within subclassroom
groups (Lu & Anderson, 2015).
Table 4: Effect of students leaving the class to an elite school on stayers’ alter-
native outcomes by quartile of the ability distribution in grade 6
Mean Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
GPA -0.0010 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0027
(N=222,703) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0024)
Behaviour -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0006
(N=263,895) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Aspirations 0.0012 0.0020 0.0027* -0.0006
(N=276,008) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0011)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change). ‘GPA’ is the grade point average, graded by the teacher.
‘Behaviour’ is measured as a Likert scale (1-5), graded by the teacher, with higher scores indicating
better behaviour. ‘Aspirations’ represents a dummy indicating students’ response to the survey
question asking whether he or she aims to enrol in higher education. We control for individual
(previous test score, gender, maternal education, and books at home) and class level (gender, ma-
ternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics. Class level variables
are obtained by leaving out individual observations (leave-out-mean). We also include regional and
cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. F-statistics of corresponding
first stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well above conventional thresh-
olds. ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result for the working sample: students in Q2-Q4 of the ability
distribution in grade 6 who are left behind in primary schools. Quartiles are constructed using the
grade 6 mean score on mathematics and reading of both stayers and leavers. For example, students
in Q4 attained an average test score in the lowest quartile of all Hungarian students. Main results
are robust when restricting the sample to students where alternative outcomes were observed. *
Significant at 10% level.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous treatment effects for alternative outcomes
Gender Socio-Economic Status (SES)
Mean Boys Girls Low SES High SES
GPA -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0019 0.0003
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0046) (0.0020)
Behaviour -0.0019 0.0028 -0.0064*** -0.0005 -0.0050**
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0023)
Aspirations 0.0012 0.0019 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0017)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change). ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result presented in Table 4. ‘GPA’
is the grade point average, graded by the teacher. ‘Behaviour’ is measured as a Likert scale (1-5),
graded by the teacher, with higher scores indicating better behaviour. ‘Aspirations’ represents
a dummy indicating students’ response to the survey question asking whether he or she aims to
enrol in higher education. We control for individual (previous outcome variable, gender, maternal
education, and books at home) and class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and
class size in grade 6) characteristics. Class level variables are obtained by leaving out individual
observations (leave-out-mean). We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the regional level. ‘Mean’ indicates the mean result presented in Table 4. F-
statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well
above conventional thresholds. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level.
These negative effects might stem from losing a close peer. High ability
students left behind, who likely applied as well, might then be discouraged
as their close peers left to an elite school while they did not. However, this
possible explanation is inconsistent with the results on the impact of same versus
different gender peers leaving the class obtained in Table B5. Many papers from
psychology and sociology have documented that friendships in primary and
middle-schools are mainly within the same gender (Kovacs et al., 1996; Mehta
& Strough, 2009; Miller et al., 2001; Poulin & Pedersen, 2007; Shrum et al.,
1988). Thus, we would expect a larger effect on boys when another boy leaves,
as well as a larger effect on girls when another girl leaves. Results in Table B5,
however, suggest otherwise. We observe that the effects on both boys and girls
are larger when a girl leaves than when a boy leaves the class. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the negative impact of losing a direct friend is driving our results.
7 Conclusion
The effect of high achieving peers on student achievement is at the core of many
educational discussions on issues such as ability tracking or school segregation
(Card & Giuliano, 2016; Guyon et al., 2012). We provide novel evidence on this
effect by exploiting changes in class composition due to the departure of high
achieving students to elite schools. Our results suggest that their departure has a
negative effect on the students who are left behind in general primary education,
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on average. In particular, we find that an increase of 5 percentage points in the
share of students who left (i.e., one additional high achieving student leaving)
leads to a reduction in mathematics test scores by 0.04 standard deviations. We
find no effect for reading, on average.
The overall results hide considerable heterogeneity. We observe that the
mean negative effect is mostly driven by high ability students left behind, by
girls, and by students with a high socio-economic status. For a subsample of stu-
dents where teacher-graded GPA, behaviour, and higher education aspirations
were observed we generally do not find significant effects.
It should be noted that we did not evaluate the outcomes of the students who
left to an elite school. A potential positive effect experienced by those students
might offset the moderate negative effects presented here. Also, the share of
students leaving for an elite school is rather limited in Hungary, amounting
to 6 percent in an average class. This corresponds to just over one student
on average, far from ability tracking structures often present in secondary of
higher education. Therefore, mean effects estimated in this paper might be
larger in settings where children left behind are facing more severe shocks in
peer composition.
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Appendix A: Figures
Figure A1: Treatment effect of 1% leavers on stayers, by ability in grade 6.
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Notes: This figure displays the interaction between test scores in grade 6 of students left behind in
general primary schools and the impact of high achieving peers leaving to elite schools on grade 8
test scores. Treatment effects reflect the impact of a 1% increase in the share of leavers in a school,
as reported in Table B4, by ability in grade 6. We control for individual (previous test score, gender,
maternal education, and books at home) and school level (gender, maternal education, books at
home, and school size in grade 6) characteristics. School level variables are obtained by leaving
out individual observations (leave-out-mean). Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
The estimated model also includes cohort fixed effects, school fixed effects, and school-specific time
trends. 95% confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the regional
level.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table B1: Comparison of leavers to reference group
Distribution of leavers (N=26,823) by: -2 SD -1 SD Mean +1 SD +2 SD
Class 98.78 92.23 71.65 36.34 9.65
(relative share) 6.63 20.85 35.74 27.02 9.77
School 99.23 94.52 76.44 39.73 10.39
(relative share) 4.75 18.23 36.99 29.56 10.47
Settlement (ZIP) 99.43 96.26 79.29 39.27 8.07
(relative share) 3.19 17.11 40.22 31.36 8.11
Region 99.93 98.61 87.27 48.95 10.12
(relative share) 1.32 11.35 38.35 38.85 10.13
Cohort 99.97 98.89 88.44 51.91 10.97
(relative share) 1.09 10.45 36.54 40.95 10.97
Notes: All numbers are measured as percentages. They reflect the share of leavers that outperforms
their respective reference group. Outperforming is indicated having a test score for either reading
or mathematics above the cutoff level (columns). For example, 88.44 percent of leavers outperforms
the cohort average test score. This group can be disentangled by students that score above 2 SD
(10.97%), above 1 SD (40.95%) and above the mean - but less than 1 SD - (36.54%).
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Table B3: Additional robustness checks
Panel A: Distance to nearest elite school (class mean)
Time by bus (min) Time by car (min)
Mathematics -0.0075** -0.0056*
(0.0038) (0.0034)
Reading 0.0020 0.0015
(0.0024) (0.0023)
Panel B: Alternative specifications
Growth
Reshuﬄing
(N=338,409)
No cities
(N=177,214)
Mathematics -0.0078** -0.0073* -0.0105***
(0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0014)
Reading 0.0019 0.0011 0.0061
(0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0100)
No movers
(N=258,289)
No outliers (distance)
(N=342,372)
No outliers (% leaving)
(N=355,009)
Mathematics -0.0075* -0.0060* -0.0101*
(0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0057)
Reading 0.0020 0.0022 0.0023
(0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0034)
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change), for different distance measures as instrumental variables.
Panel B reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite schools, for
different specifications. The ‘reshuﬄing’ effect is tested by limiting the sample to those schools
that retained a fixed number of classes between grade 6 and grade 8. Student growth (‘Growth’) is
accounted for by including second and third degree polynomials of the previous test score as control
variables. ‘No cities’ restricts the sample to schools located outside of Budapest and other locations
classified as a city. ‘No movers’ restricts the sample to classes where no one moved between grade
6 and grade 8. ‘No outliers (distance)’ and ‘No outliers (% leaving)’ restrict the sample to classes
where the median distance to the nearest elite schools, and the share of leavers to an elite school,
respectively, is less than two standard deviations above the mean. When obtaining all the above
estimates, we control for individual (previous test score, maternal education, and books at home)
and class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics.
We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.
F-statistics of corresponding first stage estimates (obtained using the same set of controls) are well
above conventional thresholds. Variation in the number of observations is due to sample selection
procedures described above. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at
10% level.
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Table B4: Treatment effects using between-cohort variation
2SLS Cohort variation
(1) (2) (3)
Mathematics -0.0077** -0.0027*** -0.0015** -0.0010
(0.0039) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Reading 0.0011 -0.0027*** -0.0018*** -0.0015**
(0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
School-specific time trends Yes
N 365,015 94,760 94,760 94,760
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite schools,
using between-cohort variation in the percentage of peers leaving within a school. We restrict our
sample to schools where at least one student left in every observed cohort within that school. ‘2SLS’
represents the mean effect presented in Table 2. We control for individual (previous test score,
gender, maternal education, and books at home) and school level (gender, maternal education,
books at home, and school size in grade 6) characteristics. School level variables are obtained by
leaving out individual observations (leave-out-mean). Standard errors are clustered at the school
level. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level.
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Table B5: Heterogeneous treatment effects by gender of leaving students
Boys leaving Girls leaving
Mean Boys Girls Mean Boys Girls
Mathematics -0.0066** -0.0047 -0.0090** -0.0091** -0.0071 -0.0112**
(0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0049)
Reading 0.0008 0.0011 0.0005 0.0011 0.0017 0.0006
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0031)
GPA -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0018
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Behaviour -0.0019 0.0023 -0.0059*** -0.0026 0.0035 -0.0073***
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0026)
Aspirations 0.0008 0.0016 0.0003 0.0012 0.0024 0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of high achieving peers leaving for elite
schools (one percentage point change) separately by gender of those leaving general primary educa-
tion. We control for individual (previous test score, maternal education, and books at home) and
class level (gender, maternal education, books at home, and class size in grade 6) characteristics.
We also include regional and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.
The percentage of a student’s male or female peers leaving the class is instrumented by boys’ and
girls’ average distance to elite schools, respectively. F-statistics for all corresponding first stage
estimates are well above conventional thresholds. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
‘Mean’ indicates the mean result for the working sample: students in Q2-Q4 of the ability distribu-
tion in grade 6 who are left behind in primary schools. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant
at 5% level.
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Table B6: Falsification tests for alternative outcomes
GPA Grade 6 Behaviour Grade 6 Aspirations Grade 6
Mean distance to elite schools (km) 0.0011** 0.0008 -0.0010***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Class level controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Individual controls include students’ gender, maternal education and the number of books
at home. Class level controls include the same variables averaged at the class level (leave-out-mean)
and the class size in grade 6. Fixed effects include cohort and regional fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the regional level. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level.
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